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Abstract
The Malaysian economy was relatively well positioned at the beginning of the Asian
Financial Crisis. However, the government’s response of tight fiscal and monetary policy,
along with contagion from surrounding countries, had severe negative consequences. The
banking industry became particularly vulnerable due to substantial loan growth preceding
the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors, leading to an increase in NPLs and capital
deterioration. As part of its approach to assist the ailing banking sector, the Bank Negara
Malaysia created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, as a
wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions. Funding for
Danamodal came from RM3 billion in central bank seed capital and RM7.7 billion of fiveyear zero-coupon bonds. Beneficiaries submitted a recapitalization strategy to Danamodal,
which performed assessments in conjunction with external advisors to determine the
viability of the institution and required injection amounts. The first phase of injections
consisted of interim Tier 2 Capital; beneficiaries then negotiated and signed Definitive
Agreements that converted the temporary capital into various types of permanent capital
and outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal. Danamodal appointed two
nominees to the beneficiary’s board of directors with additional appointments dependent
on the amount of Tier 1 capital injected. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated
mergers and implemented behavioral reforms. Injections through Danamodal totaled
approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions and all funds were repaid by 2007
resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million.
Keywords: Board nominees, Definitive Agreements (DAs), Exchangeable Subordinated
Capital Loans (ESCL), first-loss principle, interim capital

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Malaysia: Danamodal Nasional Berhad
(Danamodal)
At a Glance
As the Asian Financial Crisis began
spilling over into the Malaysian
economy, its banking industry quickly
began to struggle. Substantial loan
growth preceding the crisis and
exposure to volatile sectors had led to
an increase in non-performing loans
(NPLs) and deterioration of capital. As
part of a larger plan, on August 10,
1998 the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)
created Danamodal Nasional Berhad
(Danamodal),
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing
banking institutions. The BNM funded
this Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with
RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and
RM7.7 billion of five-year zero-coupon
bonds.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To recapitalize and strengthen the Malaysian
banking industry, while acting as an active shareholder
and Board representative to instigate mergers and
revamp corporate governance among beneficiaries
Announcement Date

July 13, 1998

Operational Date

August 10, 1998

Sunset Date

December 31, 2003

Program Size

RM16 billion authorized

Usage

RM7.59 billion by 10
institutions

Outcomes

Risk-weighted capital ratio
(RWCR) for beneficiaries
increased from 9.9% in
September 1998 to 12.3% by
the end of December 1999

Danamodal, along with international
advisors, reviewed submissions and
Injections were initially in the
performed analyses on banking Key Features
form of Exchangeable
institutions to determine their viability
Subordinated Capital Loans
and required injection amounts.
and then were converted to
Initially,
Danamodal
injected
other types of capital after
further due diligence; part of a
Exchangeable Subordinated Capital
coordinated government
Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital,
package to address the
as a temporary injection to allow for
financial crisis.
further due diligence and negotiation.
During
this
interim
period,
beneficiaries signed Definitive Agreements that converted ESCL into permanent capital and
outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal. The three primary forms of permanent
capital included Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible Preference
Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans. The different instruments provided a range of
expected returns, control, and subordination. Following the injection of capital, Danamodal
appointed nominees to the beneficiary’s Board of Directors based on the amount of Tier 1
Capital injected. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and
implemented behavioral reforms. In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to
create performance targets and closely monitored their progress. Over its lifetime,
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Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions, resulting in
an increase of risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) for beneficiaries from 9.9% at end of
September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999.
Summary Evaluation
All beneficiaries exited the scheme by 2007 resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200
million. Although Danamodal has been credited as an essential part of the banking
industry’s recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis, the IMF raised issues regarding its
strategy to spur lending and enhance beneficiaries’ leadership and corporate governance.
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Malaysia Context 1997–1998
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$101.4 billion in 1997
$72.4 billion in 1998
$4,638 in 1997
$3,263 in 1998

Data not available for 1997
Sovereign credit rating
As of Q4 1998,
(five-year senior debt)
Fitch: BBB
Moody’s: A3
S&P: ASize of banking system
$137.9 billion in 1997
$110.7 billion in 1998
Size of banking system
100% in 1997
as a percentage of GDP
100% in 1998
Size of banking system
100% in 1997
as a percentage of financial system
100% in 1998
64.8% in 1997
Five-bank concentration of banking system
61.5% in 1998
Foreign involvement in banking system
18% in 2001
Government ownership of banking system
0% in 2001
Yes in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 2009
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018.
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Overview

Background
In the years preceding the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), market participants hailed East Asia
as the global growth center for the next century, stemming from years of substantial
economic growth through international inclusion, external facing strategy, and
conservative fiscal policy (Abidin 2000). As a result, East Asian economies experienced
“rapid export-driven growth, relatively low inflation, rising per capita incomes and reduced
poverty.” Unfortunately, certain characteristics of East Asia’s rapid growth created a
precarious economic situation that ultimately precipitated financial market turmoil. After
years of pegged currency exchange rates, many regional currencies required realignment
against the U.S. Dollar. The overvaluation of currencies fed a perception of uncompetitive
export sectors and currency-peg instability. Additionally, macroeconomic imbalances
began building as short-term investment from foreign investors financed large current
account deficits across the region. Foreign capital began flowing into domestic financial
markets as well. The final vulnerability emerged in the banking sector, where high credit
growth in preceding years and the increase of funds flowing to illiquid and high-risk
sectors such as property and equity markets had led to overall fragility. Eventually the
increasing of interest rates to manage inflation and halt capital outflows exacerbated issues
in this sector as asset quality weakened and non-performing loans (NPLs) rose (BNM
1997).
The immediate response by East Asian governments to curb currency pressures included
hiking interest rates, direct currency exchange intervention, and implementing selective
measures to curtail speculation. This approach proved untenable as foreign exchange
reserves dwindled and other interventions had a perverse impact on domestic markets.
The first clear indication of the AFC occurred when Thailand was forced to abandon its
currency peg and float the Thai Baht on July 2, 1997, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the
Baht by about 10-15%. Economies such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan quickly felt the effects of this shock (BNM 1997).
Malaysia’s economy remained strong at the onset of the crisis, with an economic expansion
of 7.8% in 1997 (BNM 1997). Unlike other East Asian economies, it did not implement an
IMF-supported plan or receive IMF financial assistance due to its relatively strong balance
of payments position and its lower foreign debt load (BNM 1998a; Lindgren et al. 2000).
However, the initial Malaysian response consisted of tight fiscal and monetary policy,
similar to the IMF recommendation to neighboring countries (Abidin 2000). Examples of
such policies included “reducing the current account deficit in the balance of payments,
increasing the fiscal surplus through significant cutbacks in public sector expenditure,
reducing credit growth and containing inflationary expectations by tightening further
monetary policy” (BNM 1997). These measures aimed to repair market confidence in
Malaysia, stem economic pressures, and stabilize the exchange rate (Abidin 2000). The
government also targeted the banking sector by introducing stricter regulations regarding
the categorization of NPLs and requiring increased transparency from financial institutions
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(BNM 1997). However, it became clear that tighter fiscal and monetary policy had a
deleterious impact on the economy as real output in 1998 declined 6.7% following twelve
years of continuous expansion, averaging 7.8% annually. In response to these negative
consequences, the Malaysian government decided to reverse course; it began to relax fiscal
policies in March 1998 and ease monetary policy in August 1998. By this time, financial
market turmoil had taken its toll; the Malaysian stock market, the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE), fell by 72% and the Malaysian ringgit depreciated by 40% against the
U.S. dollar from pre-crisis levels (BNM 1998a).
Similar to the overall economy, the Malaysian banking sector was well situated at the
beginning of the AFC; this strength was displayed through quality of assets, strong
capitalization, and prudential supervision (BNM 1998a). The primary forms of deposittaking institutions within the banking sector included commercial banks, finance
companies, and merchant banks (IMF 1999). Across the banking sector, by the end of June
1997, the risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) was 12% (substantially above the minimum
of 8%) and net NPL ratios were 2.2%. In addition, the Banking and Financial Institutions
Act 1989 (BAFIA) provided an integrated approach to bank supervision in Malaysia
through regulations dictating capital ratios, transparency, and risk management (BNM
1998a).
Despite this perceived strength, underlying structural issues resulted in a deterioration of
the Malaysian financial sector as the crisis continued. One contributing factor was the
meteoric loan growth, averaging approximately 25% per year, between 1994–97. The
private sector was especially reliant on banking sector financing due to the
underdeveloped bond market (BNM 1998a). Increased lending led to elevated credit levels
relative to GDP and significant credit exposures by institutions to at-risk sectors including
property and equity markets (IMF 1999).
Due to the protracted crisis and ensuing contraction in economic activity, NPLs increased
and capital deteriorated within financial institutions. By the end of June 1998, the net NPL
ratio increased to 8.9% while RWCR had decreased to 11.2% (still above the 8% minimum)
for the system as a whole (BNM 1998a).
The ailing banking sector prompted the Malaysian government to implement a multifaceted policy approach to restore confidence in financial markets and struggling banking
institutions (BNM 1998a).
Program Description
In July 1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), on behalf of the Malaysian
government, released a National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) that outlined a strategy
of government intervention. One stated goal of the NERP was recapitalizing the struggling
banking sector to stabilize financial markets (Danamodal n.d.a). On August 10, 1998,
Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary
of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the central bank of Malaysia. This Special Purpose Vehicle
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(SPV) would serve two purposes: inject capital into banks and, through its shareholder
role, merge core and weaker institutions and improve their management (BNM 1998a).
Danamodal’s Board of Directors included BNM representatives as Chairman, Managing
Director, and other additional members along with a nominee from the Ministry of Finance
and private sector appointees (Danamodal 1998a).
After performing a number of stress tests in various scenarios, BNM estimated the
maximum budget for Danamodal to be RM16 billion. This amount would guarantee that the
RWCR across the banking industry would stay above 9% (Danamodal n.d.a). Funding for
Danamodal came from RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and RM7.7 billion of five-year zerocoupon bonds with a nominal value of RM11 billion, five-year maturity, and yield to
maturity (YTM) of 7.25% (Danamodal n.d.a; Danamodal n.d.c). The bonds traded on the
secondary market for Malaysian government securities. Unlike bonds issued by Danaharta,
Danamodal’s sister agency that purchased nonperforming loans, Danamodal’s bonds did
not carry an explicit government guarantee. However, they carried an implicit guarantee.
BNM accepted them as collateral at its discount window and treated them as government
securities on bank balance sheets in calculating banks’ liquidity and capital requirements
(IMF 1999).
Danamodal aimed to inject capital into viable, core, domestic banking institutions “based
on commercial and market-oriented principles” (BNM 1998a; BNM 1998b). Beneficiaries
submitted individual capital injection strategies accounting for various operating and NPL
scenarios prior to receiving funds (Danamodal 1998a). Danamodal would then assess the
future viability of the institution, analyzing quantitative and qualitative factors (Danamodal
n.d.a). Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney (then a unit of Citigroup) served as
external advisors throughout this process, assisting a variety of projects including
assessments and due diligence reviews (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a).
During the first phase of recapitalization, Danamodal injected Exchangeable Subordinated
Capital Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital (Danamodal 1999a). It bore an interest rate
of 7.5% annually and a three-month maturity; beneficiaries had the option to extend the
maturity if required. After receiving the interim ESCL, beneficiaries negotiated and signed
Definitive Agreements (DAs) that converted ESCL into permanent capital and outlined a
long-term relationship with Danamodal (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a). The three types of
permanent capital were Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible
Preference Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans. The different instruments provided a
range of expected returns, control, and subordination (Danamodal n.d.a). Danamodal
valued its investments based on market-based methods (Danamodal n.d.b).
Danamodal stringently observed a “first-loss” principle throughout the process, whereby
“shareholders would be required to bear all losses before the recapitalisation by
Danamodal” (BNM 1998a). Adherence to this principle resulted in beneficiaries selling
their NPLs to Danaharta, an asset management company created to purchase NPLs from
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banks, prior to receiving capital injections from Danamodal.3 The individual needs of each
beneficiary, including safety (application of first-loss principle), control, return, capital
base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements, would dictate the structure of its
investments (Danamodal n.d.a).
Following the injection of capital, Danamodal would appoint a minimum of two nominees
to serve as Executive Director and either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of
Directors of beneficiary institutions. The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated greater
Board representation. Through its Board presence, Danamodal expected to facilitate
mergers and implement behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and
credit culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (BNM
1998a). In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to create performance targets
and closely monitored their progress (Danamodal n.d.b).
Danamodal stated that it had an expected lifespan of no more than five years, with the
majority of capital injections occurring during the first two years (Danamodal n.d.a;
Danamodal n.d.b). Beneficiaries exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic
sales of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal n.d.b).
Outcomes
Danamodal injected RM6.15 billion of ESCL into 10 banking institutions in 1998, resulting
in an increase in RWCR across the banking system from 11.2% at end of June 1998 to
11.9% at end of January 1999 (BNM 1998a). Throughout 1998 to 1999, all ten beneficiary
banks, with the exception of Perdana Merchant Bankers, finalized their injection amounts
and terms through Definitive Agreements (Danamodal 1998c; Danamodal 1999d).
Danamodal performed no additional capital injections following December 1999 (BNM
2001a). The composition of the injections are shown in Figure 1 and balances over time are
shown in Figure 2.

For more information on Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) see Dreyer (2021) in the
Journal of Financial Crises.
3
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Danamodal Injections (RM millions)
Banking Institution

Total
Injection
Amount

Date of
Definitive
Agreements
Signing

Not
converted
from ESCL

Common
Shares Tier 1

Preference
Shares
(INCEPS) Tier 1

Subordinated
Loan - Tier 2

RHB Bank Berhad

1,500

November
30, 1998

–

–

1,000

500

Arab-Malaysian Bank
Berhad

800

February 5,
1999

–

–

600

200

MBf Finance Berhad

2,280

March 12,
1999*

–

362

1,238

680

United Merchant
Finance Berhad

800

March 30,
1999

483

–

317

–

Oriental Bank Berhad

700

March 30,
1999

–

250

300

150

Arab-Malaysian
Finance Berhad

500

February 5,
1999

–

–

200

300

BSN Commercial Bank
420
(M) Berhad

February 5,
1999

–

–

420

–

Arab-Malaysian
Merchant Berhad

400

February 5,
1999

–

–

–

400

Sabah Bank Berhad

140

February
12, 1999

18

24

72

26

Perdana Merchant
Bankers Berhad

50

November
13, 1998**

50

–

–

–

Total

7,590

551

636

4,147

2,256

*Danamodal injected RM680 million of Subordinated loans into MBf Finance Berhad on December 30, 1999.
**Perdana Merchant Bankers received an injection of ESCL on November 13, 1998.
Source: Danamodal 1999a; Danamodal 1999b; Danamodal 1999c; Danamodal 1999d.

The actions taken by Danamodal supported mergers and acquisition activity within the
sector. On October 8, 1998, Danamodal announced its intent to invest RM1.5 billion in the
RHB Bank and Sime Bank merger. Following its purchase of Sime Bank for RM852.2
million, RHB Bank approached Danamodal to assist in a previously estimated RM1 billion
capital shortfall (Danamodal 1998b). The injection of funds was estimated to resulted in an
increase in capital adequacy to 10.5% and was performed on October 21, 1998 (Danamodal
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1998b; Danamodal 1998d). Danamodal announced its plan to inject an additional RM723.4
million for a 30% share in RHB Capital on November 30, 1998 (Danamodal 1998d).
However, Khazanah Nasional Berhad made this investment instead of Danamodal after
expressing its interest and Danamodal’s determination “that Khazanah is in a better
position to undertake such an investment” (Danamodal 1998e).4 RHB Bank was later
acquired by Bank Utama during merger exercises performed by the BNM (Cook 2008).
Danamodal became controlling shareholder in MBf Finance following its initial injection of
RM1.6 billion in exchange for a 70% stake (Danamodal 1999c). The divestment of its
injection resulted in further consolidation as Danamodal sold its stake to Arab-Malaysian
Finance on August 3, 2001. The total price of the acquisition was RM925 million, composed
of RM475 million in cash and RM450 million contingent on NPL recoveries (Danamodal
2001b). The sale recouped funds from the RM1.6 billion injection, although it resulted in an
RM675 million loss. Additional mergers included EON Bank acquired Oriental Bank, Affin
Bank acquired BSN Commercial Bank (M), Southern Bank acquired United Merchant
Finance and Perdana Merchant Bankers, and Multi-Purpose Bank acquired Sabah Bank
(BNM 2000; Danamodal 2001a; Danamodal 2000c). It is important to note that some of
these mergers were a result of the broader effort by the Malaysian government to
consolidate the banking sector and occurred after Danamodal funds had been paid back
(BNM 2000).
Danamodal implemented behavioral reforms through its board representation alongside
broader efforts by BNM to improve corporate governance. As part of this effort, BNM
issued a framework for standard credit risk management by financial institutions. These
guidelines covered appropriate oversight by the board of directors and management,
adequate infrastructure for credit risk management, an integrated risk-management
process, and comprehensive internal controls and audit procedures. Additional reforms
included constructing a sector-wide training program for lending officers, limiting external
interference in lending decisions, and intermittent assessments by BNM on executives
based on whether they were “fit and proper” (Sulaiman 1999).
Over its lifetime, Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking
institutions, substantially less than the maximum budget of RM16 billion (BNM 2003). For
these beneficiaries, the capital injections by Danamodal resulted in RWCR increasing from
9.9% at end of September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999 (BNM 1999). On
October 21, 2003, the five-year, zero-coupon bonds issued by Danamodal matured and
operations ceased on December 31, 2003. At the time of its wind down, Danamodal had
RM2.2 billion in assets remaining and RM1 billion of capital outstanding in RHB Bank (BNM
2003). These final holdings and assets were liquidated by the end of 2007, resulting in all
institutions exiting the scheme and a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million (BNM 2007).

4

Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia.
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Figure 2: Outstanding Balance of Danamodal Injections Over Time (RM millions)
Banking Institution

Outstanding
Outstanding Balance
Outstanding Balance
Balance (February (September
30,
(December 20, 2001)
9, 2000)
2001)

RHB Bank Berhad

1,000

1,000

800

460

460

2,280

2,280

680

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

420

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

5,200

3,740

2,140

Arab-Malaysian Bank
Berhad
MBf Finance Berhad
United Merchant
Finance Berhad

Oriental Bank Berhad 700
Arab-Malaysian
Finance Berhad
BSN Commercial
Bank (M) Berhad
Arab-Malaysian
Merchant Berhad
Sabah Bank Berhad
Perdana Merchant
Bankers Berhad
Total

Sources: Danamodal 2000a; Danamodal 2001c; Danamodal 2001d.
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Key Design Decisions
1. The Malaysian Government adopted a three-pronged approach—one
component of which was recapitalization—to address the financial crisis
and strengthen the banking sector.

The Malaysian government instituted a three-pronged approach to assist its ailing banking
sector during the AFC. The three interventions dealt with purchasing Non-Performing
Loans (NPLs), recapitalization, and debt restructuring. It included:
(1) Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta): an asset management
company that purchased and managed NPLs from banking institutions;
(2) Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal): a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that
injected capital into banking institutions;
(3) Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC): a debt restructuring agency that
allowed borrowers and creditors to negotiate agreements and avoid legal
proceedings (BNM 1998a).
Each individual program interacted with one another in various ways. For example, banks
sold their NPLs to Danaharta at fair market value, resulting in substantial losses. In a
healthy economic environment, these banks would be able to raise capital to make up for
this shortfall through shareholders. However, due to uncertain financial conditions, there
was insufficient appetite from investors. Therefore, Danamodal stepped in to recapitalize
these institutions and restore capital levels. In fact, Danamodal required beneficiaries to
sell their NPLs to Danaharta in order to receive capital injections, resulting in existing
shareholders bearing the losses associated with these sales. Additionally, if negotiations
undertaken by the CDRC could not reach a consensus, Danaharta purchased the NPLs from
the dissenting institutions, which assisted the restructuring process (BNM 1998a).
Due to the overlap between programs, shown in Figure 3, the Malaysian government
created a Steering Committee that coordinated the interventions of Danaharta, Danamodal,
and CDRC. The Governor of the BNM chaired the Steering Committee, which met every two
weeks. Its primary responsibilities included ensuring “operations of these institutions are
well coordinated and complement each other, and to keep track of their progress” as well
as properly sequencing interventions (BNM 1998a).
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Figure 3: Malaysia’s Multi-Pronged Approach

Source: Author’s analysis based on BNM 1998a.

2. Danamodal was a limited liability company and wholly owned subsidiary
of BNM.
Danamodal was legally categorized as a limited liability company and incorporated on
August 10, 1998 as a wholly owned subsidiary of BNM (BNM 1998a; Danamodal 1998a). Its
governance structure reflected this ownership as its board of directors had BNM
representatives as Chairman, Managing Director, and other additional members. The board
also consisted of a nominee from the Ministry of Finance and private sector appointees
(Danamodal 1998a).
3. BNM announced the creation of Danamodal through a press release and
maintained transparency throughout its existence.
On July 13, 1998, BNM announced the creation of an SPV to recapitalize the banking
system. The press release occurred two months after the creation of Danaharta and it
references the SPV as a complement to it; “as Danaharta was set up to help remove NPLs
from the banking system, there is a need for us to explore other pre-emptive alternatives to
recapitalise the banking system.” The approach to recapitalization included a dual
objective:
(1) To inject government capital, both in “core” banking institutions and in weaker
institutions that BNM identified as viable;
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(2) To merge core and weaker banking institutions, taking advantage of its role as a
strategic shareholder (BNM 1998b).

The press release outlined a number of characteristics of the SPV including structure,
lifespan, financing requirements, and operation and financing arrangements. It explains
that the SPV would receive seed capital from BNM, with additional funding through bond
issuances, and have a finite lifespan with the goal of selling its holdings once it achieved its
objectives. The maximum expected budget was RM16 billion, which would maintain a riskweighted capital ratio (RWCR) above 9% across the banking system. In addition, BNM
would leverage international consultants to construct the operating details and financing
arrangements of the SPV (BNM 1998b).
Danamodal was transparent in disclosing changes in management, operations, and
selection criteria. A significant number of these announcements occurred through press
releases. It also issued financial statements that aligned with international accounting
standards (BNM 1998a). Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, an independent and external vendor,
audited these annual financial statements.
4. Danamodal strictly employed a “first-loss” principle during interventions.
Under the “first-loss” principle, “existing shareholders were required to bear all losses
prior to recapitalization.” In practice, the application of this principle required banks to
mark down the value of existing shareholders investments to accurately reveal net tangible
assets and sell their NPLs to Danaharta prior to receiving capital injections from
Danamodal. This forced shareholders to realize the losses stemming from declining
investments and NPL sales. In addition, it resulted in “equitable burden sharing” and
reduced the use of public funds (BNM 1998a).
The “first-loss” principle also played an integral role in the negotiation of Definitive
Agreements (DAs), which specified the terms and types of capital used in capital injections
(Danamodal 1999a).
5. Danamodal conducted an industry-wide stress test and determined it
needed RM16 billion to recapitalize the banking sector.
The worst-case scenario estimated by BNM dictated a budget of RM16 billion. This funding
amount would guarantee that the RWCR across all banking institutions would be at least
9% (BNM 1998a). To estimate a maximum budget the BNM conducted a preliminary,
industry-wide stress test in May 1998 that examined how banking institutions performed
based on a variety of parameters and assumptions. The analysis looked at institutionspecific characteristics such as projected NPLs, specific provisions (property and shares),
investments, and off-balance-sheet items. In addition, it included environmental factors
such as interest rates (three-month Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate or KLIBOR),
foreign exchange (USD/MYR exchange rate), real estate (property prices), equity markets
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(Kuala Lumpur Composite Index), and contagion risk from exposure to Indonesia, Thailand,
Korea (Danamodal n.d.a).
The results of the stress test, shown in Figure 4, prescribed a maximum funding
requirement of RM16 billion, approximately 12% of Malaysia GDP. This was broken down
into two phases; the first phase would recapitalize 14 banking institutions that the BNM
deemed very likely to experience solvency issues and required a total of RM12.8 billion to
bolster their RWCR to greater than 9%. The second phase involved 11 institutions that the
BNM felt had a lower likelihood of experiencing solvency issues. Therefore, the BNM
allocated RM1.6 billion to ensure that the RWCR of these lower-risk institutions stayed
above 9%. In addition, the BNM added a precautionary 10% buffer, totaling RM1.6 billion
(Danamodal n.d.a). Only 10 of the 14 institutions identified in the phase-one analysis
received injections, as “Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, Bank of Commerce Berhad,
Perwira Affin Bank Berhad and Utama Merchant Bank Berhad…opted for their own
solutions to address their capitalisation issues” (Danamodal 1999c). Improved market
conditions made injections for the institutions associated with phase two unnecessary (IMF
1999).
Figure 4: Stress Test Results
Number of Institutions
Type
of
Institution

Injection Amount

Total
Injection
Phase 1 (RM Phase 2 (RM Amount (RM
billion)
billion)
billion)

Phase 1

Phase 2

Commercial
Banks

8

5

8,586

475

9,061

Finance
Companies

3

6

3,603

1,094

4,697

Merchant
Banks

3

–

579

52

631

(10% buffer)

–

–

–

–

1,611

Total

14

11

12,768

1,621

16,000

Source: Danamodal n.d.a.
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6. The recapitalizations were funded through seed capital from BNM and
bond issuances.
In order to fund itself, Danamodal received RM3 billion in seed capital from BNM
(Danamodal n.d.a). It then raised an additional RM7.7 billion on October 21, 1998, through
the issuance of zero-coupon bonds (Danamodal n.d.c). The BNM decreased its statutory
reserve requirement from 6% to 4% in conjunction with this issuance (Cook 2008; IMF
1999). It also required banks to use the additional liquid capital from the lowered
requirement to buy Danamodal bonds (Cook 2008). The bonds had a nominal value of
RM11 billion, five-year maturity, yield to maturity (YTM) of 7.25%, and qualified as a classone liquid asset with zero risk-weighting for capital requirements. Additionally, Danamodal
had the ability to extend the duration of the bonds, either partially or fully, by a minimum
of one year and maximum of five years. The new YTM, if Danamodal triggered the maturity
extension, would equal the “sum of the average YTMs of Malaysian Government Securities
(MGS) of similar or closest tenor to the extension period and 50 basis points (Danamodal
n.d.c). Unlike Danaharta, Danamodal’s bonds did not carry an explicit government
guarantee (BNM 1998a). However, the bonds carried an implied government guarantee
since Danamodal was wholly owned by BNM (IMF 1999).
Initially, 57 banking institutions subscribed to the Danamodal bond issuance and future
pricing and liquidity were determined by the secondary market for Malaysian government
securities, where Danamodal’s bonds regularly traded (Danamodal n.d.a; IMF 1999). On
October 21, 2003, Danamodal redeemed its bonds at maturity at a nominal value of RM11
billion (BNM 2003).
7. Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney served as independent advisers
during the recapitalization process.
Danamodal leveraged the expertise of “reputable, international financial advisors,”
Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a). They were
selected due to their ability to:
(a) Immediately provide highly trained resources, bridging the learning curve gap;
(b) Supplement Danamodal’s resources needed to meet performance expectations;
(c) Provide a third party objective and independent viewpoint;
(d) Provide expert advice skills and methodologies to ensure an effective
recapitalization process (Danamodal n.d.a).
The advisors had a number of functions, such as performing assessments and due diligence
reviews (BNM 1998a). These reviews were a prerequisite to receive funds and aimed to
gauge the overall health of the beneficiary as well as determine the amount of capital
required (BNM 1998a; IMF 1999). Other responsibilities included the construction of an
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operational infrastructure along with overall policies and procedures governing capital
injections (Danamodal n.d.a).
8. To determine the viability of beneficiary institutions and recapitalization
amounts, Danamodal conducted comprehensive individual assessments.
Along with BNM, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Smith Barney, Danamodal worked to assess
the long-term prospects for each institution (Danamodal n.d.b; IMF 1999). The selection
process included an in-depth analysis of competitive position and financial standing of each
banking institution, quantification of potential synergies to be realized through
consolidation, and CAMEL (capital, assets, management, earnings, and liquidity) analysis
(Danamodal 1998a). The banks that were selected as beneficiaries were identified in the
first phase of stress tests and defined as very likely to experience solvency issues
(Danamodal 1999c). The risk profiles of these banks were determined through the stress
tests outlined in KDD 5 (Danamodal n.d.a). Of the original 14 banks identified in phase one,
10 received capital injections, while Bank Bumiputra, Bank of Commerce, Perwira Affin
Bank, and Utama Merchant Bank secured alternative solutions (Danamodal 1999c). Bank
Bumiputra Malaysia and Bank of Commerce were merged with government assistance
outside of Danamodal; Perwira Affin Bank acquired BSN Commercial and did not require a
further injection of capital; and Utama Merchant Bank was recapitalized by its
shareholders. It is important to note that none of the banks identified as lower-risk
institutions in the second phase received injections (IMF 1999).
Figure 5: Danamodal Recapitalization Assessment Process

Source: Danamodal n.d.a.
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9. Danamodal injected Tier 2 capital then signed Definitive Agreements (DAs)
with beneficiary institutions, converting the capital into three types of
securities.
Danamodal would first inject Tier 2 subordinated debt, in the form of Exchangeable
Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), which was converted into equity, debt, or hybrid
capital through Definitive Agreements (DAs) (BNM 1998a; IMF 1999). ESCL bore an
interest of 7.5% annually and had a three-month maturity, with the option for beneficiaries
to extend. The temporary funds allowed for additional due diligence and negotiations prior
to conversion (Danamodal 1999a).
Following this interim period, stakeholders signed DAs that outlined recapitalization
amount and instruments used (including the decision whether to convert the ESCL into
permanent Tier 1 and/or Tier 2 capital), pricing of instruments, investment protection, exit
option, shareholder’s call option (Danamodal n.d.a). It is important to note that Danamodal
used market-based valuation methods in making investment decisions (Danamodal n.d.b).
The DAs varied across institutions due to the unique situation of each individual
beneficiary, and time constraints required an accommodating and practical approach. Six
main principles guided Danamodal’s structuring of investments: safety (application of firstloss principle), control, return, capital base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements
(Danamodal n.d.a).
The three primary instruments used for capital injections by Danamodal and their
characteristics are outlined in Figure 6. The different instruments allowed Danamodal to
tailor injections to the issues faced by the at-risk institution. The composition of the capital
injection depended “primarily on the cash flow characteristics of the instruments and the
unique circumstances of the banking institutions concerned” (BNM 1998a).
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Figure 6: Characteristics of Capital Used by Danamodal
Expected
of Capital
Rate
of Control Level
Category
Return

Type
Capital

Direct control
through
proportionate
voting rights
and
board
representation

Subordination Additional
Level
Features
Call option that
Potential for results
in
complete
existing
erosion
of shareholders
value
if compensating
company
Danamodal by
performs
transferring
poorly
shares
at
nominal value

Common
Shares

Tier 1
12%
Capital

Irredeemable
NonCumulative
Convertible
Preference
Shares
(INCEPS)

Moderate
control
through board
8% (12%
Tier 1
representation
when
Capital
(negotiation
converted)
and potential
for
conversion)

Priority
to
common
equity
in
liquidation
proceedings

Tier 2
10%
Capital

High
downside
protection
N/A
behind senior
debt

Subordinated
Loans

None

Fully
convertible to
common shares
in all cases

Sources: Danamodal Nasional Berhad n.d.a; Danamodal 1998a, BNM 1998a.

10. In order to institute behavioral reforms and facilitate mergers, Danamodal
appointed nominees to the boards of beneficiaries.
Danamodal appointed a minimum of two nominees to serve as Executive Director and
either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of Directors of beneficiary institutions.
The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated additional Board representation beyond the
minimum two appointees. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and
implemented behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and credit
culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (BNM 1998a).
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The restructuring process employed by Danamodal encompassed improvements in
financial analysis and capital frameworks, operations, IT, organizational structure, human
resources, and the beneficiary’s business portfolio. The initial phase consisted of an
internal and external situation assessment, followed by the development of a strategic plan
(strategic position, operational design, IT design, etc.) and implementation plan (changes in
restructuring, governance, consolidation, etc.) (Danamodal n.d.a).
11. Danamodal created performance targets for the beneficiary institutions
and monitored their progress towards these targets.
Prior to receiving capital injections, beneficiaries were required to provide a
comprehensive business plan and establish, in conjunction with Danamodal, “a list of
comprehensive performance targets, monthly reporting, and swift and firm remedial
actions against the banks in the event of material shortfalls in performance relative to such
targets” (Danamodal n.d.b). Danamodal closely monitored these performance targets,
tightening its overall approach to banking supervision. This included requiring financial
statement reporting to the BNM on a quarterly, semi-annual, and yearly basis, along with
weekly and monthly balance sheet disclosure. The BNM also deployed CAMEL-based
supervision, which focused on capital adequacy, asset quality, and management, regarding
both in-person assessments, which were increased to a minimum of once per year for all
banks, and external monitoring. Additional supervisory changes included BNM approval of
financial statements prior to public disclosure and creation of “prompt corrective
measures” which created pre-agreed responses by bank managers and owners to breaches
of regulatory levels (IMF 1999).
Many of the indicators that were assessed are outlined in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Major Performance Indicators
Performance
Measure

Monitoring Strategy

Rate of Migration of
• Monitor percentage of loans in each loan class (current,
Performing Loans to
substandard, doubtful, bad) on a monthly basis
Non-Performing
Loans
NPL Recovery

Average
Rate

• Monitor loan migration between classes of loans
• Monitor amount of NPLs converted into collateral
• Monitor amount of collateral sold in each period

• Make assessments of FMV of underlying collateral on all
Recovery categories of loans on a periodic basis
• Monitor actual cash values received versus estimates. Encourage
cash sales of collateral/loans
• Monitor performance and trend of Net Interest Margin on a
monthly basis

Net Interest Margin

• Identify sources of strengths and weaknesses of Net Interest
Margin
• Conduct monthly reviews of pricing by product compared to
competitors
• Performance of fee-based business lines as well as prospects for
growth

Non-Interest
Income Growth

• New initiatives that may be undertaken to develop new, feebased
businesses

Cost Structure
Non-Interest
Expense Growth

• Identify and monitor the sources of strengths and weaknesses in
overall cost structure
• Encourage major focus by management on appropriate level of
overhead needed to match current business opportunities
• Detailed management reports on salary, overhead expenses, and
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other operational costs
Cost to Income

• Benchmark progress in improving overall efficiency relative to

Ratio

other institutions

Loan Growth

• Gross loan production figures provided monthly with periodic
assessment of negative or positive trends
• Amounts and trend of new loan disbursements

Deposit Growth

• Total deposit figures provided monthly with periodic
assessment of any trends

Source: Danamodal n.d.a.

12. BNM anticipated that the recapitalization process would take five years.
At inception, BNM predicted that the recapitalization process would take no more than five
years. This timeframe would allow Danamodal to accomplish its short and medium-term
objectives and make significant headway towards the long-term goal of industry
consolidation and restructuring (Danamodal n.d.a). It is important to note that Danamodal
expected the majority of capital injections to occur during the first two years (Danamodal
n.d.b). Danamodal’s exit strategy followed the below principles:
(a) Seize the earliest chance to exit;
(b) Achieve objectives of recapitalization or enhance prospects of future achievement;
(c) Aim for full recovery of investments;
(d) If the overall economic recovery helps to restore solvency issues among banking
institutions, the need for Danamodal’s continued involvement may be reduced;
(e) Adhere to the overall policies views of the Malaysian government and BNM
regarding the timing of the exit (Danamodal n.d.a).
On October 31, 2003, approximately five years after its creation, Danamodal closed its
operations (BNM 2003). It exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic sales
of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal n.d.b).

III. Evaluation
BNM championed the success of the Danamodal program; it found that the speedy creation
and implementation of the scheme was an essential part of the banking industry’s recovery
from the AFC. The capital injections performed by Danamodal helped struggling but viable
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banking institutions raise capital and instill enhanced corporate governance (BNM 2003).
This resulted in beneficiaries resuming lending activities and led to increased consumer
confidence along with a revival of business and economic activities in the domestic real
sector (BNM 2003; Danamodal n.d.a). In addition, BNM stated that Danamodal’s strict
observance to the “first-loss” principle successfully minimized the total cost of
recapitalization (BNM 2003). BNM felt the capital injections were performed “with a strong
commercial orientation, focus on speed and outcomes, transparency in [Danamodal’s]
policies and operations, sense of public accountability and credibility, and bias for hope and
possibilities” (Danamodal n.d.a).
On the other hand, the IMF expressed concerns regarding Danamodal’s attempts to replace
ineffective leadership with more capable alternatives. In particular, the IMF feared, even
with new senior leadership, the potential for “inadequate, ineffective, or otherwise
deficient management teams [to] remain.” This could lead to similar issues occurring in the
future. Additionally, the IMF felt that the emphasis on loan growth by BNM and the
interventions aimed at sparking growth had the potential to generate poor quality loans
(IMF 1999).
Abidin (2000) credits the Malaysian government’s interventions as having “made serious
efforts and registered good progress in restructuring its financial and corporate sectors,”
specifically citing the success of Danaharta and Danamodal. These two programs were
particularly effective “because they were executed efficiently, in a transparent manner and
at a cost much lower than that incurred by the other crisis-hit countries” (Abidin 2000).

IV.
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Key Program Documents

Summary of Program
(BNM 1998a) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1998
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions and
providing an outline of Danamodal.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-1998.
(Danamodal n.d.a) “Danamodal Nasional Berhad - the Malaysian approach to bank
recapitalisation, revitalisation and restructuring”
An overview from Danamodal of the recapitalization and restructuring efforts.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-nasional-berhad-malaysian-approach-bankrecapitalisation-revitalisation-and.
(Danamodal n.d.b) “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Danamodal.”
An FAQ document from Danamodal providing information on its operations.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/frequently-asked-questions-faqs-danamodal.
(Danamodal 1998a) Details on Establishment of Danamodal Nasional Berhad
A notice on the establishment of Danamodal and details surrounding its operations.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/details-establishment-danamodal-nasional-berhad.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
(BNM 2001b) Best Practices for the Management of Credit Risk
Guidance from the central bank on risk-management practices for banks.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/best-practices-management-credit-risk.
(Danamodal n.d.c) Salient Terms and Conditions of the Bonds
The term sheet for the Danamodal bonds.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/salient-terms-and-conditions-bonds.
Press Releases/Announcements
(BNM 1998b) Recapitalisation and Consolidation of the Banking Sector
A press release from the central bank on the plan to recapitalize and consolidate the banking
sector.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/recapitalisation-and-consolidation-banking-sector.
(BNM 2000) Consolidation of Domestic Banking Institutions
A press release on the consolidation of the banking sector in Malaysia.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/consolidation-domestic-banking-institutions.
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(Danamodal 1998b) Danamodal Plans to Inject RM1.5 billion into RHB Bank
A notice on Danamodal’s plans to inject capital into a bank in 1998.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-plans-inject-rm15-billion-rhb-bank.
(Danamodal 1998c) Danamodal to Inject RM50 billion into Perdana Merchant Bankers
Berhad
A notice on Danamodal’s plans to inject capital into a bank in 1998.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-inject-rm50-billion-perdana-merchantbankers-berhad.
(Danamodal 1998d) Danamodal Concludes Capital Injection of RHB Bank Berhad and Buys
30% of the Bank
A notice on Danamodal’s support to RHB Bank and government ownership of the bank.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-concludes-capital-injection-rhb-bankberhad-and-buys-30-bank.
(Danamodal 1998e) Khazanah’s Interest in RHB Bank
A press release on the potential interest in one of the banks receiving support via Danamodal.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-concludes-capital-injection-rhb-bankberhad-and-buys-30-bank.
(Danamodal 1999a) Danamodal Nasional Berhad today signed Definitive Agreements with
four banking institution
A press release on Danamodal’s support to four banking institutions in 1999.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-nasional-berhad-today-signed-definitiveagreements-four-banking-institution.
(Danamodal 1999c) Danamodal Injects RM1.6 billion into MBF Finance Berhad
A press release on Danamodal’s support to MBF Finance Bank in 1999.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-injects-rm16-billion-mbf-finance-berhad.
(Danamodal 1999d) Danamodal Signs Definitive Agreements with Oriental Bank Berhad
and United Merchant Finance Berhad
A press release on Danamodal’s support to two banks in 1999.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-signs-definitive-agreements-oriental-bankberhad-and-united-merchant-finance.
(Danamodal 2000a) Investments in Recapitalised BIs
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through February 2000.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bis-0.
(Danamodal 2000c) BSN Commercial Bank (M) Fully Repaid Danamodal's Loan of RM420
Million
A press release announcing the repayment of Danamodal’s support by BSN Commercial Bank.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bsn-commercial-bank-m-fully-repaid-danamodals-loanrm420-million.
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(Danamodal 2001a) Repayment of Danamodal’s Loan of RM700 Million to Oriental Bank
Berhad
A press release announcing the repayment of Danamodal’s support by Oriental Bank Berhad.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/repayment-danamodals-loan-rm700-million-orientalbank-berhad.
(Danamodal 2001b) Danamodal Signed S&P Agreement With Arab-Malaysian Finance
Berhad for the Sale of 100% Equity Interest In MBf Finance Berhad
A press release announcing the sale of Danamodal’s interest in a financial institution.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-signed-sp-agreement-arab-malaysianfinance-berhad-sale-100-equity-interest-mbf.
(Danamodal 2001c) Investments in Recapitalised Bis
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through October 2001.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bi.
(Danamodal 2001d) Investments in Recapitalised Bis
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through December 2001.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bi.
(Sulaiman 1999) Governor's Keynote Address at the National Credit Management
Conference
A transcript from a speech given by the central bank governor in 1999.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/governors-keynote-address-national-creditmanagement-conference.
Key Academic Papers
(Abidin 2000) Malaysia’s alternative approach to crisis management
A journal article outlining the Malaysian government’s response to the Asian financial crisis.
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Appendixes

Appendix A: Timeline of Interventions
Date

Actions Taken by the Malaysian Government

July 2, 1997

Thailand forced to abandon its currency peg and float the Thai Baht
resulting in depreciation of the Baht by 10-15%

January 1998

The Malaysian Government created the National Economic Action
Council

March 1998

The Malaysian Government begins to relax previously tight fiscal
policies

May 1998

BNM performed a stress test to ascertain the likely size of a
recapitalization scheme

June 20, 1998

Danaharta, an asset management company for the purchase and
management of NPLs, was incorporated

July 1998

The NEAC announced a comprehensive National Economic Recovery
Plan (NERP) to bring about stability and expedite economic recovery

July 13, 1998

BNM releases a press release describing its recapitalization plan

August 1998

The Malaysian Government begins to ease previously tight monetary
policy

August 10, 1998

Danamodal Nasional Berhad incorporated by BNM

September
1998/
September
1998

1, The Malaysian Government introduces selective exchange control
measures/fixes the RM3.80 to USD
2,

October 21, 1998

Danamodal issued RM7.7 billion in five-year, zero-coupon bonds

November
1998

13, Danamodal injected RM50 billion into Perdana Merchant Bankers

November
1998

30, Danamodal signed DA with RHB Bank Berhad

February 5, 1999

Danamodal signed DA with Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad, ArabMalaysian Finance Berhad, BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad, and
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Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad
February
1999

12, Danamodal signed DA with Sabah Bank

March 12, 1999

Danamodal signed DA with MBf Finance Berhad

March 30, 1999

Danamodal signed DA with United Merchant Finance Berhad, Oriental
Bank Berhad

December
1999

30, Final Injection performed by Danamodal

October 21, 2003
December
2003

Bonds issued by Danamodal mature

31, Danamodal ceased operations

Sources: BNM 1997; BNM 1998a; BNM 1998b; BNM 2001a; BNM 2003; Danamodal 1998c; Danamodal 1998d;
Danamodal 1999a; Danamodal 1999b; Danamodal 1999c; Danamodal 1999d; Danamodal n.d.a; Danamodal
n.d.c.

Appendix B: Breakdown of Injection Process
Core Process

Objective

Tasks

Assessment of • To assess the criticality of
Recapitalization
capital deficiency
Requirements
• To quantify the amount of
capital required by the
banks to withstand the full
impact of the crisis

• Establish the framework to assess
capital needs
• Establish methodologies and tools to
assess recap requirements
• Conduct due diligence
• Quantify capital needs

Recapitalization/
Investment

• To speedily inject capital • Establish selection criteria and assess
into
viable
banking each potential candidate against these
institutions
criteria, which will include (but would
not be limited to): criticality of capital
• To structure investment deficiency, systematic impact of the
in order to optimize safety, bank’s failure, non-feasibility of market
control, return, capital
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adequacy, exit potential, solutions, potential synergies to be
and monitoring capabilities realized through consolidation, and
specific requests from shareholders
• To satisfy stakeholders’
expectations
• Formulate options
• To maintain or promote •
Structure
the
recapitalization
objectivity,
consistency, investment (i.e. price, terms and
independence, credibility conditions, type of securities)
of process
• Negotiate with banks on recap
amount, valuation, timing, mode of
investment, representation, and other
terms and conditions
• Finalize contractual agreements
Financing of the • To obtain cost-effective • Ascertain the funding requirements
Recapitalisation funds
to
finance vis-à-vis quantum and timing
Danamodal’s
• Evaluate financing alternatives
recapitalization initiatives
(sources and modes of financing)
• Liaise with BNM and other agencies to
ensure a well-coordinated capital and
fundraising program
Restructuring
and Monitoring

• To restore stability

• Participate actively in the corporate
governance process

• To effect turnaround

• Influence management agenda
• To use shareholder’s
rights to inject best • Establish performance targets and
practices,
promote regular reviews of performance/status
managerial
excellence,
enhance
operating • Act decisively and effectively in
with
deviations
from
efficiency, and improve dealing
expectations
profitability
• To protect the value of
investments
through
constant monitoring of
financial, operational, and
managerial performance of
banks
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• Formulate restructuring strategies
and determine specific policies and
instruments for achieving the goals
• Seize opportunities to strengthen the
banking sector through consolidation
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• To promote consolidation and restructuring
and restructuring of the
industry

Exit

•
To
dispose
of
Danamodal’s
stake
in
banks and optimize returns
on
Danamodal’s
investments
and
the
achievement
of
restructuring objectives

• Determine timing and amount of
disposals
• Evaluate disposal alternatives: initial
public offerings (IPOs), strategic sales,
and direct sale to market
• Distribute gains on disposal to
Danamodal’s shareholders

Source: Danamodal n.d.a.
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